When do participants in a market have the incentive to enter into agreements that exclude potential entrants? This paper synthesizes, extends and illustrates the theory of exclusionary contracts. In a model of incumbent contracts with downstream buyers, a "Chicago benchmark" yields no incentive for exclusionary long term contracts. Departures from the benchmark in each of three directions yield predictions of exclusion. These include the two existing theories (Aghion-Bolton 1987 and Rasmusen-RamseyerWiley 1991) as well as a third, vertical theory: that a long term contract at one stage of a supply chain may extract rents at another stage. Contracts with upstream suppliers, on the other hand, do not necessarily yield a …rst-mover advantage for the incumbent. We consider upstream contracts in which …rms bid simultaneously for the rights to upstream inputs, with bids for exclusive rights being an available strategy, and then compete in a downstream market. With su¢ cient complementarity upstream and substitutability downstream, the bidding game equilibrium allocates all inputs to a single …rm -excluding the other …rm from the market. We examine an antitrust case that illustrates all four channels for exclusionary contract incentives.
Introduction
The debate over whether contracts can have anticompetitive exclusionary e¤ects has been central to competition policy. In cases involving tying, 1 exclusive dealing, 2 and long-term contracts 3 , courts have struck down contracts as anti-competitive in excluding potential suppliers. But contracts are entered into voluntarily. Why would buyers in a market have the incentive to enter contracts that are anticompetitive?
The traditional theory is that a dominant …rm can impose exclusionary contracts to its own bene…t and to the detriment of consumers. Exclusionary contracts are themselves be evidence of monopoly power over consumers signing the contracts. 4 The early Chicago school responded with a simple proposition. Contracts are voluntary, not imposed, and must maximize the combined bene…ts of the contracting parties. If another contract achieved higher total bene…t, parties would adopt it, splitting the gains in bene…ts, whatever the relative bargaining power of the parties. Contractual terms, apart from price, must therefore be explained as wealth-maximizing, not as the result of relative market power or bargaining power. This insight, essentially a version of the Coase theorem (1960), is fundamental.
A second proposition, o¤ered by some Chicago economists, would seem to follow: if a contract maximizes the combined bene…ts of the buyer and seller signing the contract, it must be e¢ cient. Government intervention that limits the set of feasible contracts cannot improve welfare because a voluntary contract, chosen freely by these market participants, maximizes bene…ts. A contractual clause, such as a requirements or exclusivity clause, is not chosen unless it is e¢ cient. 5 The second Chicago proposition is wrong. As Aghion and Bolton (1987) showed, con- , CT-1994-01 (Canada), ("Nielsen"). The latter case is analyzed in section 4 of this paper. 4 In Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Laidlaw Waste Systems (1992), 40 C.P.R. (3d) 289 (Comp. Trib.). ["Laidlaw "], the government economic expert argued that "if one contracting party is a monopolist ... it can preserve its market power by insisting that its customers (or suppliers) sign long-term contracts ..."; and "buyers gain nothing from the . . . provisions in the contract [at issue in the case]. Hence, the very fact that nearly all buyers sign such contracts is evidence that Laidlaw has and exercises market power". [Expert Report of Roger Noll, Laidlaw, pars. 21 and 42] 5 Judge Robert Bork is often cited for this view. He states "The truth appears to be that there has never been a case in which exclusive dealing or requirements contracts were shown to injure competition. A seller who wants exclusivity must give the buyer something for it. If he gives a lower price, the reason must be that the seller expected the arrangement to create e¢ ciencies that justify the lower price." (Bork (1978) : 309). tracts need not be e¢ cient where there are externalities imposed by contractual terms on agents outside the contracts. Even a simple long term contract can be anticompetitive in acting as a barrier to entry. A"post-Chicago" literature has developed investigating the conditions under which contracts can pro…tably be used to exclude rivals. This paper synthesizes and extends the theory of exclusionary contracts, then applies the theory to Director of Investigation and Research v. D&B Companies of Canada Ltd., CT-1994-01 (Canada) ("Nielsen"). 6 We use this case to illustrate the full range of incentives developed by the post-Chicago literature. Nielsen is remarkably rich in the set of contractual strategies adopted by the …rms involved, and the case reveals a wider range of incentives for exclusionary contracts than has been developed in the literature.
We begin in the next section of the paper with a synthesis of the theory of exclusionary contracts under the traditional assumption that the incumbent has a …rst-mover advantage in o¤ering contracts. Consider an incumbent in a market, purchasing an essential input from upstream input suppliers, selling to downstream buyers and facing potential entry by a number of entrants. The entrants' (common) cost of production is random, and the incumbent has the opportunity to o¤er a contract prior to the realization of entrants' cost. Within this framework, we set out a "Chicago benchmark" set of conditions under which no incentive for long-term exclusionary contracts exists: no market power outside the contracting pair and no …xed costs on the part of entrants. No externalities are imposed on sellers outside the contract because these sellers earn zero rents and no externalities are imposed on buyers because under constant returns to scale other buyers are not a¤ected by a particular contract. 7 Maximum pro…ts are extracted with an e¢ cient long-term contract under this benchmark set of assumptions. We then introduce three minimal deviations from this benchmark that yield exclusionary contracts. The …rst of these is market power on the part of entrants (a single entrant). The role of a long-term contract with liquidated damages is to make the strategy of remaining in the incumbent's contract so attractive that a entrant, successfully entering the market, must o¤er a low price to attract the buyer (Aghion and Bolton 1987) . The contract thus implements a transfer from a party outside the contract (the entrant) to one of the contracting parties (the buyer), a transfer that can be shared between the contracting parties.
The second deviation from the Chicago benchmark is to assume instead a single upstream supplier. Consider the incumbent, anticipating negotiations ex post with the input supplier over the input price and searching for a strategy that would diminish the input supplier's threat point in these negotiations. The threat point for the supplier is to sell to the incumbent's rivals, the potential entrants, who would then serve the downstream buyers. Thus a pro…table strategy for the incumbent is the o¤er of long-term contracts with downstream buyers, since these contracts make new entry less pro…table, thus reducing the entrants'willingness to pay for the input. The e¤ect of a long-term downstream contract is a reduction in the upstream input price -a transfer from the upstream supplier.
The third departure from the Chicago benchmark we consider is a …xed cost on the part of entrants. Zero pro…t on the part of the entrants is preserved via an assumption of contestability. In this setting, the probability of either entry or competitive discipline by the entrants depends on the number of free buyers as well as the contract itself. The incumbent signs up buyers to long-term contracts for a relatively small price by exploiting the fact that each buyer ignores the externality her acceptance decision imposes on other buyers through the reduction in the probability of entry. This idea is familiar from Aghion-Bolton (1987) and Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) / Segal and Whinston (2000) (RRW-SW) but is developed here as one component of an integrated model.
Nielsen involved the Canadian market for scanner-based information including market shares, demand elasticity estimates, and sensitivity of demand to product promotions. Upstream suppliers (grocery chains) provided scanner data to Nielsen, the incumbent, which transformed the data into a usable form, combining it with software, which it then sold to downstream buyers (grocery manufacturers). In 1986, Nielsen faced the threat of entry by a second …rm, Information Resources Inc. (IRI). As soon as the threat of entry by IRI was evident, Nielsen switched to long-term contracts with a critical subset of buyers. The facts of the case are consistent with both the traditional Aghion-Bolton and RRW-SW theories of the downstream contracts and, as we discuss below, the vertical theory. A second set of contracts was at issue in Nielsen: contracts with upstream suppliers of raw data. These contracts contained 5-year exclusivity provisions. Nielsen illustrates the principle that while an incumbent almost inevitably has a …rst-mover advantage, this is not true of upstream contracts. Nielsen and IRI negotiated for the rights to upstream inputs in a short period of time in the summer of 1986.
We develop the following model in section 3 of this paper to o¤er predictions on exclusionary contracts as a market outcome when the incumbent has no …rst-mover advantage.
Two …rms bid simultaneously for the rights to each of n upstream inputs. Each …rm i submits a two-part bid (b i j ; e i j ) to each upstream supplier j. The …rst element is a bid for the right to the input j; the second element is a bid for the exclusive right to the input j. Then, simultaneously, each upstream …rm j accepts the highest among: e . The decisions of the n input suppliers thus determine an allocation of rights a = (a 1 ; : : : a 2 ) with each a j = 1; 2 or B (with a j = B representing an allocation of the jth input to both …rms).
Given the allocation, the two downstream …rms compete in the downstream market with products whose value to buyers depends on the set of inputs incorporated in each product.
The bids by each …rm for input rights re ‡ect the pro…ts anticipated in the downstream competition conditional upon di¤erent allocations. In the application to Nielsen, a larger set of informational inputs renders the …nal product more valuable to buyers; but the model applies more generally to rivalrous goods. We …nd that when combined pro…ts are maximized by an allocation of all inputs to one …rm exclusively, then this allocation also represents the only possible equilibrium to the non-cooperative bidding game. Joint pro…ts are maximized at an exclusive allocation to one …rm, under a set of two conditions: a high degree of complementarity of upstream inputs, and high inherent substitutability (conditional upon identical inputs) of the products downstream. 8 The outcome of universal, exclusionary contracts upstream in Nielsen was, we suggest, the inevitable outcome of the bidding game given upstream complementarity and downstream substitution in the market.
Finally, an application of our vertical theory of exclusionary contracts, discussed above, involves an interaction between the upstream game and the downstream game. In the upstream game, if the incumbent and the entrant are similar in their ability to earn pro…ts as a subsequent monopolist, then most prospective rents are transferred upstream in the form of bids. The equilibrium bid in any auction under certainty is the value of the item (here, the rights) to the agent with the second highest value. Any strategy that the incumbent can implement to reduce the value of the rights to the entrant leads to a lower accepted bid for the rights -and therefore a reduction in the transfer of monopoly rents upstream. The adoption of long-term contracts downstream is one such strategy. Hence our vertical theory of the long-term contract with downstream buyers: by adding asymmetry to the upstream bidding game, the downstream contract implements a transfer of rents from the upstream suppliers to the contracting pair. Section 4 of this paper applies the theories of the previous sections to Nielsen, then discusses the wide range of additional strategies adopted in the case.
Contracting with a First-mover Advantage: Downstream
In writing contracts with buyers, an incumbent typically has a …rst-mover advantage in the sense that as soon a potential rival appears ready to enter the market the incumbent can be the …rst to o¤er the contracts. Production takes time, and a potential entrant can seldom write complete forward contracts for delivery of its product before the product exists. In this section, we synthesize the economic theory of exclusionary contracts with buyers under the assumption of an incumbent …rst-mover advantage.
Why would buyers voluntarily enter into contracts that deter entry or reduce the probability of entry? Deterring entry bene…ts the incumbent, but would appear to harm buyers. The right question, however, is not why buyers agree, but why the sum of bene…ts to contracting parties increases with exclusionary contracts. The answer is in the use of the contracts to extract a transfer from outside parties. We set out a "Chicago benchmark" in which no externalities are imposed on outsiders and in which a long-term contract, if it is written, must be e¢ cient. We then delineate the incentives for exclusion through minimal departures from the benchmark model. Three departures from the benchmark correspond to the implementation of transfers from three di¤erent parties to the contracting pair. A transfer can be extracted from the entrant if the entrant has market power. A transfer can be extracted from an upstream input supplier if the supplier has market power (a vertical externality). Or transfers can be extracted from other buyers if buyer surplus is positive (a horizontal externality).
Exclusionary practices in general can lead to three types of ine¢ ciencies: ine¢ ciencies in the quantity sold by the protected incumbent charging high prices; ine¢ ciencies in the loss of product variety when di¤erentiated …rms are excluded; and ine¢ ciencies in the prevention of production by the lowest-cost producer. We restrict attention to the last of these by assuming that all buyers purchase 0 or 1 unit and share a common value v for a homogenous product. The fact that buyers must purchase from either the incumbent or entrant in our model means that these downstream contracts are simple long-term contracts. Exclusivity restrictions would be super ‡uous.
We adopt a canonical market structure (Figure 1 ). An incumbent …rm I is supplied by upstream suppliers and sells to n downstream buyers. The incumbent …rm faces potential entry by rivals, who face a random, but common, cost of production, c, with a distribution G( ) and density g( ) that is strictly positive on support [0; c] with c > v. G(c) is the probability that entrants would willingly supply all n buyers at a price c, and in this sense can be interpreted as the supply curve of the entrant(s). We denote the elasticity of this supply as .
The incumbent's cost is c I , and the upstream input cost is also known. The incumbent has the opportunity to o¤er buyers an ex ante (or "long-term") contract prior to the realization of the entrants'cost, c, and the entrants and incumbent compete for any "free"buyers ex post as Bertrand competitors. The ex ante contract can be described in two ways. A contract can be denoted by a price p that the buyer pays if she does trade with the incumbent and a stipulated damage d that the buyer pays if the buyer decides ex post not to trade with the incumbent. Equivalently, the buyer pays the amount d up front and then pays an additional amount p d if she decides to buy the product. In other words, the contract can be described as a call option with option price d and exercise price p d: We take the call option interpretation and adopt notation p o for the option price and x for the exercise price. The entire competitive impact of an ex ante call option contract lies in whether the optimal exercise price, x , satis…es x = c I or x < c I . If the latter holds, then for realizations c 2 (x ; c I ), the entrant(s) do not produce ex post, in spite of being the lowest cost producers, since they cannot match the exercise price of the incumbent. The wrong …rm produces. Entrant Market Power (Aghion-Bolton): The upstream supply is perfectly competitive, but there is a single potential entrant. Without a contract, the ex post pricing game is Bertrand, with the entrant supplying at a price equal to x if c < x and the incumbent supplying otherwise at a price equal to min(c; v). The contract maximizes the incumbent's pro…t subject to the individual rationality constraint that the buyers achieve expected utility at least as great as in the subgame without a contract. The optimal x simply maximizes the total surplus generated by the contract for the contracting parties, which is equal to v minus the expected cost of acquiring the product from either the rival or "in-house" production:
The necessary …rst order condition for this maximization leads directly to the following:
Equation (2.1) is simply the monopsony version of the standard Lerner equation. As AghionBolton demonstrated with a functional form representation of the problem, the contracting parties act as a monopsonist in purchasing from the entrant, setting the optimal monopsony price. A monopsonist that values a product at a constant -which here is c I , the cost of production by the incumbent that is avoided when the product is purchased from the rival -will always set a price x to satisfy (2.1). As a monopsonist, the incumbent-buyer pair sets the exercise price below its unit value. The rents that the entrant earns in low-cost states are open to extraction via the call option contract between the incumbent and each buyer: lowering x reduces the price that the entrant must charge to attract the buyer, thus implementing a transfer from the entrant to one of the contracting parties. This incentive reduces the optimal x , resulting in the x < c I ine¢ ciency.
Our call-option version of the Aghion-Bolton model is more than a simple change in notation from the original model. The Aghion-Bolton theory has been dismissed by a number of scholars because (in the original version) the theory requires a liquidation damage, d, that exceeds the lost pro…ts, p c I . A penalty for contract termination that exceeds anticipated pro…ts is not enforceable under common law. Thus Richard Posner writes "The speci…c device considered by Aghion and Bolton, a penalty clause in the monopolist's contract with his customers, is not apt, because penalty clauses are legally unenforceable wholly apart from any antitrust objections." (Posner 2001, p.232 ). In our model, no liquidation penalty is required; the critical component, an exercise price less than marginal cost, is enforceable.
Upstream Market Power (the Vertical Externality Theory): Assuming competitive entrants but a single upstream supplier isolates a second theory, the vertical externality theory. We assume that the supplier produces the input at zero cost; that each unit of the downstream product requires one unit of the upstream input; and that ex post bidding for the m units of inputs takes place before production and sales to downstream buyers. (If the upstream input is non-rivalrous, such as information, then the bidding is for the exclusive rights to the input.) payo¤s with no long-term contract: The multiple entrants will bid max(0; v c) for the input since owning it provides the right to be a monopolist in the downstream market with additional cost c. If c I < c < v the incumbent wins the auction, paying (v c) and produces and sells at v; if c > v the incumbent wins the auction with a bid of 0. Hence the incumbent's expected pro…t with no long-term contract is
and the buyer's expected surplus without a long-term contract is 0.
payo¤s with a long-term contract: Consider …rst the strategy on the part of the incumbent and a buyer of entering a contract with x > c I . In this case, the incumbent's maximum bid for the input ex post is x c I ; the entrants'bid is max(0; x c). The incumbent wins the bidding if c > c I and pays a bid equal to the entrant's bid. In this case the incumbent's pro…ts earned ex post (disregarding the initial option price p o ) are x c I minus the entrant's bid, which is 8 > > < > > :
Since the buyer pays a price x whatever the realization of c, the total expected surplus to the incumbent and the buyer from the long-term contract when x > c I is
From this, @S c =@x = G(x) < 0, showing that the strategy x > c I is dominated by x = c I and will therefore not be taken. The optimal x thus satis…es x c I . It then follows that the incumbent loses (c I x) by winning the bid for the input ex post and will therefore bid 0 for the input. 10 The entrants will submit positive (and identical) bids if x > c. Hence the expected total surplus to the buyer and seller from a long-term contract is, for x c I ,
. Optimizing S c with respect to x yields (2.1). The buyer and seller again act as a monopsonist against the Marshallian supply curve of the entrants.
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Fixed Costs (Horizontal Buyer Externalities): This theory parallels the development of the "divide-and-conquer" argument in RRW (1991) and Segal-Whinston (2000) . 12 At least two entrants each share a common …xed cost F , with F > v, and the common, random variable cost, c. The incumbent has an opportunity to o¤er a long-term contract ex ante, and ex post entrants and the incumbent make simultaneous price o¤ers. An entrant incurs the …xed cost after buyers have accepted its o¤er. In making price o¤ers entrants can discriminate between those who have an existing contract with the incumbent and those who do not. In the ex post pricing game, the incumbent is committed to the option price x to buyers in the long-term contract; its strategy is the o¤er of a price to free buyers. The pricing game has three types of outcomes depending on the realization of c: for su¢ ciently low c an entrant supplies all buyers at a pair of prices to contract and free buyers, (p c ; p f ) that yields zero pro…ts; at a higher cost realization c, the incumbent supplies all buyers with its price to free buyers being limited by potential entry; and at a su¢ ciently high price the incumbent sets p f = v.
13
One sub-game Nash equilibrium in this game involves the incumbent o¤ering a (p o ; x) = (v; 0), with all buyers accepting, as in RRW. A single buyer has no incentive to deviate unilaterally because rejecting the contract alone would not allow any discipline by entrants on ex post pricing game and the buyer would pay p f = v as a free buyer. The incumbent 10 It must enter a bid to avoid the contingency that no bid is entered for the input; the incumbent has an obligation to ful…ll the buyer's option to buy at x. 11 The concept of a "supply curve" is slightly subtle here. This is a Marshallian supply curve, taking the input price …xed at 0, even though the input price will not in general be 0 in equilibrium. 12 Aghion-Bolton (1987), section 3, developed the idea earlier but in a setting in which the incumbent could o¤er contracts with a price conditional upon how many buyers accept. This type of contract might be di¢ cult to enforce. 13 Over the range of low c where an entrant supplies at two di¤erent prices, there is a multiplicity of equilibria or "sustainable"prices. The mapping from long term contract o¤ers and realized c to equilibrium prices is a correspondence. We adopt the following re…nement on the selection of equilibrium from this equilibrium correspondence: (a) the selection is di¤erentiable; (b) the contract option price p o (being a sunk cost) does not a¤ect the equilibrium over the range of c where an entrant provides; (c) the contract price c(p o ; x; c) is non-decreasing in x, ceteris paribus.
extracts full pro…t, una¤ected by the threat of entry in this equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, however, all buyers play "accept"in the acceptance subgame, earning zero surplus, whereas "reject" by all buyers is a Pareto-superior Nash equilibrium of this subgame since it allows the buyers a positive expected surplus in the (no-contract) ex post pricing game. If we restrict attention, as in Segal-Whinston, to subgame perfect Nash equilibria in which Pareto optimal Nash equilibria are selected in any subgame, then the unique equilibrium involves the o¤er to m buyers of a contract with x < c I and a price p o that leaves each buyer with the same expected utility as in the no-contract subgame. This framework is the simplest departure from the benchmark to capture this incentive channel. The proof that x < c I under these assumptions is provided in the appendix. The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
Under the Chicago Benchmark, the equilibrium value of x is x = c I , and the optimal contract is equivalent in terms of expected payo¤s to writing no contract at all.
Any equilibrium x satis…es x < c I under the sets of assumptions summarized above as: (1) entrant market power, (2) upstream market power or (3) …xed cost and contestable entrants.
Under the last set of assumptions, the number of buyers o¤ered long-term contracts, m, is less than n.
The interpretation of a contract as an option, which is central in Aghion-Bolton as our call-option interpretation makes clear, goes back at least to Oliver Wendall Holmes (1897), who famously stated that "the duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it and nothing else." This is the essence of the economic interpretation of "contract", as opposed to the interpretation by some legal centralists and philosophers that a contract entails a moral obligation not to breach. 14 To an economist, any contract is an option. The case application in section 4 of this paper draws on all three theories.
Simultaneous Bidding for Exclusivity: Upstream
In o¤ering upstream contracts the incumbent may have a …rst-mover advantage (as it almost always does with downstream contracts). If the risk of entry is signi…cant, an upstream 14 Note that our model of the horizontal buyer externality basis for exclusionary contracts in particular respects Justice Holmes'principle that any contract is an option -the essence, as we have suggested, of the economic interpretation of "contract". This is not true of the RRW-SW model. …rm may purchase exclusive rights to all of upstream essential inputs so as to guarantee a monopoly. The gains to trade, which are the prospective monopoly pro…ts, are shared with the upstream …rms via the purchase price of the exclusive rights. 15 In general, however, the incumbent cannot be assured of …rst-mover advantages in setting upstream contracts. Nothing stops a new (and unanticipated) entrant from immediately engaging upstream suppliers in contractual arrangements. As we will discuss in the next section, in Nielsen the entrant and incumbent negotiated with upstream suppliers over a short period of time. We represent this kind of competition for upstream rights as a simultaneous auction in this section of the paper, and characterize the conditions under which the competition for upstream inputs will result in monopolization of a downstream market.
Consider two …rms that are supplied by n upstream suppliers, and seller to downstream buyers. For simplicity (and to match the facts of the case studied in the next section), the n inputs supplied are, rights such as patent rights or the rights to the use of particular information or other property. That is, the goods are non-rivalrous. 16 Each downstream …rm acquires a subset of the rights from the upstream suppliers in a bidding game described below, and the two …rms then compete in the downstream market, earning pro…ts that depend on the allocation of rights to the two …rms. If the downstream output were observable, it would in general be optimal to submit contracts such as non-linear royalty contracts for the upstream inputs. 17 Competition would take the form of contract o¤ers, as in Bernheim and Whinston (1998). We assume that outputs are not observable, so that the only feasible bids for upstream inputs are dollar amounts. Whether or not the rival has access to an input is observable, so that bids can be conditioned upon that event. The questions we ask are how the payo¤s in the non-cooperative bidding game compared to the total pro…ts that could possibly be achieved in the market; whether there is the incentive to enter into exclusive bids; and when the equilibrium in the bidding game for upstream rights will assign all rights 15 A case which is often associated with this theory is Alcoa (United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F . Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Lopatka and Godek (1992) , however, suggest a di¤erent view. The theory as sketched in the text is incomplete, since a "hold-out" problem arises among upstream suppliers in that some may choose to wait to sell to a rival entrant. (An analogous hold-out problem is analyzed in section 4 of this paper.) Note that the theory has many variants. For example, if input suppliers vary in cost, it may be optimal for an incumbent to contract with only the major, lowest-cost input suppliers. And the pro…tability of exclusivity in this case may derive not from the complete monopolization through erection of barriers to entry but through raising the costs of existing rivals. This theory of vertical foreclosure is a central theme of the raising-rivals'-costs literature (Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) ; Salop and Sche¤man (1983) and (1987); Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) ). 16 The relaxation of this assumption is discussed at the end of this section. 17 For example, if n = 1, then the single upstream input supplier by accepting the appropriate royalty contracts from downstream …rms could elicit the prices downstream that maximized total industry pro…ts.
to one …rm, so that the outcome is an exclusionary set of contracts that ensures a monopoly for one downstream …rm.
We consider the following game. First, the downstream …rms i = 1; 2 simultaneously submit bids (b i j ; e i j ) to each of the n upstream suppliers; b i j is a bid by i for the (shared) right to j's input; e i j is a bid for the exclusive right. Next, each upstream supplier j accepts bid(s), choosing the maximum from fb
The result is an allocation a fa 1 ; :::a n g with a j 2 f1; 2; Bg where a j = B indicates that the input has been allocated to both …rms. That is, each input j is allocated to 1; 2 or both. The two downstream …rms earn pro…ts 1 (a) and 2 (a). These pro…t functions are an exogenous reduced form summary of the payo¤s from downstream competition. We have in mind that the pro…t functions represent the payo¤s from a di¤erentiated Bertrand competition subgame, in which the value of either downstream product, 1 or 2, to buyers depends on the set of upstream inputs incorporated in the product.
(In the case study following, the downstream product is an aggregation, with value added, of upstream, geographically-di¤erentiated, raw information inputs.) i (B; :::B) > 0 because of, for example, inherent product di¤erentiation in a Bertrand pricing game, as opposed to product di¤erentiation induced by the assignment in a of di¤erent inputs to the two …rms. 18 Our interest in this game is in the prediction of when the equilibrium allocation of the game will assign all rights to a single downstream …rm. To this end, we consider an arti…cial, "semi-cooperative"game in which the entire set of …rms, upstream and downstream, choose an allocation subject to the constraint that given the allocation competition will take place.
In this arti…cial game, lump sum transfers are possible so that the allocation chosen is a = arg max a 1 (a)+ 2 (a). The allocation a maximizes industry pro…ts subject to the constraint that given a; …rms 1 and 2 compete downstream. The optimum a can in principle take on any one of seven con…gurations: all a i = 1; all a i = 2; all a i = B; all a i = 1 or 2; all a i = 1 or B; all a i = 2 or B; and some a i = each of 1; 2 and B. For example, if inherent product di¤erentiation is high enough that both …rms produce in the optimum; if a subset of inputs, M , is critical to the production of either product; and if simultaneous purchase of any input outside of M would greatly reduce product di¤erentiation (thereby making downstream price competition more intense ) then a would allocate the inputs in M to both …rms and the remaining inputs exclusively to one …rm or the other. We assume that each pro…t function is monotonically increasing in the set of inputs allocated to the …rm and decreasing in the set of inputs allocated to the rival …rm.
The following proposition, proved in the appendix, connects the equilibria in the non- 18 Inputs could in principle be cost-reducing rather than value-adding in the downstream market.
cooperative bidding game and the semi-cooperative game.
Proposition 2. If 8 j 2 f1; : : : ; ng, a j = 1 or 2, then either a is the unique allocation implemented by the bidding game or an equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary. If a = (1; 1; :::; 1) or (2; 2; :::; 2) then either a is the unique allocation implemented by the bidding game or an equilibrium does not exist.
If there were only one upstream …rm, and the only kind of bids available were exclusive bids, it would be trivial to show that the allocation maximized total industry pro…ts. Here there are many inputs, simultaneous bidding, and bids for non-exclusive and exclusive rights.
In general, the equilibria in the semi-cooperative game and the bidding game do not coincide. An equilibrium may not exist, however. Suppose, for example, that n = 10, and a assigns all inputs to the …rm 1 which then earns monopoly pro…ts of 100 downstream. The most that …rm 1 could pay for each input on average is 10. But …rm 2, a close inherent substitute, may respond by paying a total of 30 for 3 inputs: duopoly pro…ts are less than half monopoly pro…ts, but they may exceed 30%. In other words, 3 input suppliers may "hold out" for a higher bid from …rm 2. So a is not an equilibrium. But then any allocation other than a is also not an equilibrium, since in any duopoly between close substitutes, the total monopoly pro…ts exceed the duopoly pro…ts; therefore 1 will out-bid 2 for any particular subset of inputs. An equilibrium does not exist in this case. On the other hand, there may be multiple equilibria. The collective pro…t-maximizing allocation may be B, but achieving this requires the two bidding …rms to coordinate on bids b 1 and b 2 ; b 1 = b 2 = 0 for example is always an equilibrium.
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Structured Model: We must address our central question -when will the equilibrium set of contracts result in exclusion of one …rm from the market? -with a more structured model or example. In this structured model, we rely on the case of symmetric inputs, in assuming that i (a) depends only on the numbers of inputs assigned to each …rm. (This will be the case if the values of the two products to …nal buyers depend only on the numbers of inputs incorporated in each product.) De…ne the pro…t functions in this case as b i (n 1 ; n 2 ), i = 1; 2, where (n 1 ; n 2 ) are the numbers of inputs allocated to the two …rms. Then the equilibrium b a will be (1; :::; 1);i.e. will assign all inputs to …rm 1, if a = (1; :::1) and the following condition holds ("no hold out"): there is no m < n such that b 1 (n; 0)=n < b 2 (n m; m)=m. If a = (1; :::; 1) and the no-holdout condition fails, then there is no equilibrium.
The central question is thus reduced to a necessary and su¢ cient set of two conditions: a = (1; :::1) and the no-holdout condition. When will these be satis…ed? To answer this question, we must get underneath the exogenous pro…t functions and into the conditions The parameters of the model are t, ; and n. Figure 2 below illustrates, for n = 10, the sets of parameters t and for which (1) the privately e¢ cient allocation a assigns all inputs to the same …rm; and (2) the parameters for which this allocation is implemented in the choice of i 0 not equal to i, must be zero. Prat and Rustichini provide su¢ cient conditions under which a pure strategy equilibrium exists in a GPTA. The key condition is a balancedness-type condition, which does not hold in our game (as is evident by the nonexistence of equilibrium for some parameters). Prat and Rustichini also provide conditions for the existence of equilibria tha maximize aggregate pro…t, which in our terminology means conditions under which a is an equilibrium. These fail in general in our game. If the bidding in our game were solely for exclusive use of inputs, then the pro…t-maximizing property of the equilibrium would follow directly from section 4 of Prat and Rusticini, which studies games in which agents have only 2 possible actions. But in our model, agents have a choice among 3 actions, 4 actions including the choice of not supplying rights to either …rm. the bidding game. When upstream complementarity is su¢ ciently high, the only possible values for a assign all rights to one …rm or all rights to both …rms, i.e. a = (b; b; :::b), since the inputs must be used together. If we add the condition of su¢ ciently high inherent substitutability (low t), then the allocation (b; b; :::b) is ruled out by the intensity of competition that would drive down pro…ts were both …rms to acquire the inputs. This leaves exclusivity as the privately e¢ cient outcome with low t and high . For this exclusivity outcome to be implemented by the auction, however, the hold-out problem must be overcome. This requires even stronger upstream complementarity and/or downstream inherent substitutability because when the pro…tability of exclusivity at one …rm is marginal, it is relatively easy for the other …rm to out-bid its rival for a subset of the inputs. Its bid re ‡ects a sharing of the prospective pro…ts among only this subset of input providers. In short, the central prediction of the simultaneous bidding model is exclusivity, resulting from a single winner of all simultaneous bidding games, providing that three conditions hold: (1) su¢ cient complementarity upstream; (2) su¢ cient inherent substitutability downstream; and (3) informational conditions that restrict bids to dollar values rather than contracts.
20
Interpretation in terms of Rivalrous Goods: Our structured model of bidding for upstream inputs adopts assumptions consistent with the case study in the next section of the paper, in particular the assumption that the inputs are nonrivalrous. Is the assumption of non-rivalrous goods necessary for the general, reduced-form model, which takes payo¤ functions i (a); i = 1; 2 as exogenous? 21 The model as it stands allows for the case rivalrous goods under additional assumptions. The following is an example. Assume that each input is produced a constant unit cost, and that negotiations or bidding for the contractual rights to the use of inputs is undertaken in the …rst period of a model. (This assumption re ‡ects the fact that decisions on which inputs are to be used in production is often a long run decision.) Suppose, as is common in the exclusive contracts literature (e.g. RRW), that prices cannot be contracted for in the long-term contracts and that the long-term contracts are therefore naked-exclusion or "naked-rights"contracts, with the price for each input being determined in a second stage via take-it-or-leave o¤ers by whichever …rm has the rights to the input. These prices will be set, obviously, to the unit cost. The downstream …rms then choose quantities simultaneously as Cournot duopolists. The pro…ts earned in the second 20 In the region where a = (B; :::; B), then a is implemented with the bidding strategies by each …rm i for each upstream input j: [b ij ; e ij ] = [:5(1=n) 1 (1; 1; ; ; 1); (1=n) 1 (1; 1; ; ; 1)], and the strategy of B by each downstream …rm whenever the payo¤ from B is the maximum. At this pair of identical strategies, neither …rm has an incentive to change any of its bids unilaterally. 21 We are grateful to a referee for posing this question. 
Application: Nielsen
We have outlined four channels through which an incumbent …rm and its buyers, suppliers or both have the incentive to enter exclusionary contracts -that deter a rival from entering a market. In this section we illustrate the incentive with a Canadian competition policy case, Nielsen. 23 Nielsen, wholly owned by D&B, had a monopoly in Canada over the provision of market-tracking services for grocery store produce sales, when it was threatened in 1985 with the entry into the market by Information Resources Incorporated (IRI). IRI is a U.S. …rm with which Nielsen shared the U.S. market in approximately equal market shares at the time.
The products at issue in the case are a combination of software and information that allowed tracking of market shares, estimation of demand elasticities and responsiveness of demand to product promotions, and so on. The downstream buyers of these information products are mainly manufacturers of grocery products. The key inputs required are raw scanner data provided by the major grocery chains, 11 chains in Canada in 1985. Conditional upon the same raw data inputs, the Nielsen and IRI products were very similar but not identical. 24 Some important product di¤erentiation arises, however, due to the fact that Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. …rms prefer the product adopted by the U.S. parent because of complementarities in using the same software and informational products. In the upstream market, scanner data from grocery chains in the same regions were presumably functional substitutes, but evidence indicated a strong complementary in that a national data set, made up of data from all regions, was the product that Nielsen and IRI judged to be of the highest value. In short, the market was characterized by strong complementarity in upstream inputs and strong substitutability between the downstream information products. Finally, 22 If commitment to prices and quantities is possible in long term contracts, the analysis is very di¤erent. Consider the simplest case of a single upstream supplier and two symmetric …rms downstream. The input supplier can charge royalty rates to the two downstream suppliers that will elicit the monopoly price, and full monopoly pro…ts downstream (Chen and Ross 2003) . Bidding for rights would take the form of contracts and, analogous to common-agency theory, result in maximum industry pro…ts. In contrast to our model and application, in which long term royalty contracts are not possible, this model predicts that exclusionary contracts would not be signed. 24 We label this feature as low inherent product di¤erentiation in the discussion of our theoretical model.
we refer to Nielsen as the incumbent because it was established in the broad market for market-tracking services, but the scanner-based information products were in development in the mid-1980's. 
Competition for Exclusive Contracts with Upstream Suppliers
As in our model in section 4, the incumbent Nielsen did not have a …rst-mover advantage.
In fact, as Nielsen emphasized in its evidence, the potential entrant, IRI, was the …rst to o¤er an exclusive contracts. The bidding was not literally simultaneous as in our theory, but was concentrated in a few months; our adoption of the usual assumption of simultaneous competition is a better …t than usual to the facts of the case. And consistent with the model, the principal elements in each contract were the price for upstream data and parameters of exclusivity rather than more complex royalty schemes.
The market for rights to the data inputs, in short, was one in which competition was intense -but the competition was for rights to the upstream inputs, not competition within the output market. Does this type of competition in some sense substitute for competition within the market -or provide any welfare bene…ts at all? Under the facts of this case, the substitutability or low inherent product di¤erentiation downstream and the complementarity of inputs upstream, the equilibrium outcome of competition for the rights to inputs was a monopoly no matter how intense the competition, i.e. no matter how symmetric the positions 25 Nielsen introduced the full scanner-based information product in 1988, after the main events on which the case focussed.
26 Nielsen, p.62. 27 Signi…cantly, as we shall discuss, the Tribunal did not nullify the entire upstream contracts.
of Nielsen and IRI were in their potential for exploiting the monopoly position. The socially optimal allocation of input is clearly an allocation to both …rms -especially because the input as a non-rivalrous good can be supplied to the second …rm at zero cost. 28 The bene…ts of the non-exclusive allocation are two-fold: providing greater product variety in the market (in allowing, for example, greater matching of software between Canadian subsidiaries and U.S. parents) and allowing price competition downstream instead of monopoly pricing. The model and economic principle -the con ‡ict between privately and socially e¢ cient contracts -generalize to the case where inherent product di¤erentiation is strong enough that the equilibrium outcome is not a monopoly. Suppose that product di¤erentiation is so strong that total industry pro…ts would be maximized by the presence of both …rms in the market. In general that industry pro…ts (upstream and downstream)
will be maximized by allocating some raw inputs exclusively to Nielsen and some to IRI:
the di¤erence in the allocation of inputs translates into greater di¤erentiation and therefore less intense price competition in the output market. If the two …rms were cooperatively choosing the allocation of inputs, and then competing, in general some exclusivity but not complete exclusivity may well result. Partial exclusivity can increase pro…ts when it results in two …rms competing because of the "competition-dampening e¤ect"of exclusive dealing: increasing the sets of inputs to which …rms have exclusive rights increases product di¤eren-tiation in the …nal market, which dampens price competition, and raises equilibrium prices and pro…ts. Firms choice of how many input suppliers to sign up exclusively would trade o¤ the private bene…ts of the competition-dampening e¤ect with the costs of reduced product value. Again, however, the social optimum involves no exclusivity because this maximizes the value of each product to any purchaser (at zero social cost) and enhances downstream price competition, bringing prices closer to marginal cost.
Competition for the market in the form of competition for rights to upstream data inputs, in short, does not substitute for competition within the market, as the Tribunal noted. 29 It does, however, yield one simple e¢ ciency bene…t. Suppose that the two …rms that are bidding for exclusive rights have positive costs, rather than zero costs, with constant marginal cost. Under a mild restriction on demand, the result of the bidding game is that at least the "right" monopolist is chosen. Whichever monopolist, Nielsen or IRI, would produce the greater social surplus is the one that would win the game. 30 Two other aspects of the strategic interaction between the …rms reviewed below, however, distort even this modest e¢ ciency outcome and leave us with the Aghion-Bolton type of prediction that the higher cost (or lower surplus) …rm may survive as a monopolist in this market.
The key e¤ect of intense competition for exclusive rights, when the downstream …rms are symmetric in demand and costs and product di¤erentiation is relatively low so that monopoly is the outcome, is a shift in monopoly rents upstream to the suppliers of the raw data as the price for the data is bid up to the present value of resulting monopoly pro…ts.
The scarce input was the raw data, not the ability to manage a monopoly downstream. The suppliers of raw data, the grocery store chains, were principle bene…ciaries of the contract exclusivity. In light of the ultimate bene…ciaries of the exclusivity contracts, it is interesting to note that the proposal to sign up retailer data suppliers exclusively was the outcome of negotiations that were initiated by the Retail Council of Canada, a trade of the (upstream) suppliers.
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The bidding game was not perfectly symmetric, of course. Any asymmetry in the bidding game that Nielsen was able to create -to foreshadow the implications of the downstream contracts -acted to increase Nielsen's share of the increase in aggregate industry pro…ts attributable to exclusivity.
Nielsen' s Downstream Contracts
The terms of Nielsen's contracts with selected downstream purchasers of their information products jumped from less than 1 year (evergreen contracts terminable on 8 months'notice) to 3 to 5 years as soon as IRI attempted to enter the industry. The internal documents of Nielsen read as if management had just read the Aghion-Bolton working paper. These documents indicated that the strategic purpose of the shift in contract lengths was to deter the entry of IRI by "locking up"customers in long-term contracts. The contracts contained liquidated damages payable to Nielsen if the customer terminated the contract. 30 A su¢ cient restriction on demand is that the percentage di¤erence in demand between Nielsen's product and IRI's product be independent of price. Under this assumption, the product generating the higher pro…t is also the product generating the higher total surplus. 31 Nielsen, p.63.
The horizontal externalities theory applies here because each client would view the probability of IRI entering -an event which with positive value for the client -almost una¤ected by its own decision to accept the long-term contract. A small "bribe" in terms of a lower price would be su¢ cient to induce the client to sign the long-term contract. The …rst AghionBolton theory applies as well: the stipulated damage clauses was of low expected cost to the downstream customer at the time of contracting in part because even if IRI were to be successful in entering, IRI would in negotiations with the buyer e¤ectively pay for part of the stipulated damage since this damage would reduce the joint surplus which the negotiations would allocate. By raising the stipulated damage, the incumbent and buyer in any downstream contract were implementing a transfer away from IRI, contingent on the states of successful entry, to the pair of them.
Just as in the horizontal externalities theory, the ability of the incumbent to discriminate in long-term contract o¤ers was an important ingredient in implementing exclusivity. Nielsen did not induce all customers to sign long-term contracts but instead targeted the Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. customers of IRI. It was the loss of these buyers to which Nielsen was most vulnerable, and the gain from signing long-term contracts with them was the highest.
Finally, a vertical externality as analyzed in section 3 of this paper applies. The fact that Nielsen as the incumbent was able to enter the downstream contracts described, provided it with an asymmetric advantage over IRI in the upstream bidding game for the exclusive rights to the data. IRI's willingness-to-pay for the upstream data was surely reduced by the disadvantage it faced in overcoming the long-term contracts downstream. The long-term contracts downstream thus imposed a negative externality, and extracted a transfer, not just from IRI but also from upstream data suppliers in allowing Nielsen to win the upstream game with lower bids.
One e¤ect of this vertical externality is to negate even the modest e¢ ciency property that we claimed for the upstream bidding game. It no longer follows that Nielsen would be forced out of the market in the event that it was not the "right"monopolist: the advantage transferred from the downstream contracting game to the upstream game leads to the possibility of an Aghion-Bolton type of ine¢ ciency in allowing an ine¢ cient incumbent to remain as a monopolist.
Renegotiation and Staggered Contracts
Let us return to the upstream contracts. After signing contracts with identical (5 year) terms with all of the data suppliers, Nielsen recognized that 5 years later (in the summer of 1991) it would potentially face the identical bidding war with IRI for the rights to the essential inputs. The prospect was again competition for the right to be the monopolistcompetition that shifted rents upstream. In 1989, Nielsen renegotiated contracts with two suppliers including Safeway, the largest supplier.
32 While the e¤ect of contract staggering was not a monopoly -this market structure was already guaranteed by exclusivity whether contracts were staggered or not -the outcome was a barrier to entry into the position of being the monopolist in the market. In an internal document produced in the case, the President of Nielsen Canada stated "After we did our retailer deals …ve years ago, we recognized that we were vulnerable because virtually all of these agreements expired around the same time. We set ourselves a goal then to pursue a practice that would result in our retailer and distributor contracts expiring at di¤erent times. This would make it much more di¢ cult for any competitor to set up a service unless he was prepared to invest in signi…cant payments before he had a revenue stream."(Nielsen, p.66)
Just as with Nielsen's ability to establish downstream contracts, discussed above, this staggering of contracts negates the modest e¢ ciency property of the upstream bidding game. The social cost of this staggered contract strategy was, at a minimum, that the most e¢ cient monopolist would not necessarily occupy the market. 33 The pro…tability of the staggered contract strategy is not explained simply by its pro…tability to Nielsen. The two suppliers voluntarily renegotiated their contracts. It is the external e¤ect or transfer of wealth away from the other suppliers of data to the pair of parties undertaking any contract renegotiation that is the key to explaining the strategy.
Most-favoured Nation Clauses
An additional issue that arose in Nielsen is that of preferred supplier contracts or mostfavoured nation (MFN) clauses in the upstream contracts. These were terms whereby Nielsen would be guaranteed that its price would not be higher than a price at which the data 32 Nielsen was able to renegotiate the Safeway contract as a result of a merger between Safeway and Woodwards. The contract with Steinberg, a smaller supplier, was renegotiated the same year (Nielsen, p. 62). 33 The strategy of staggered contracts was not in and of itself challenged by the government in the case, for an obvious reason. The prohibition of staggered contracts would be an unworkable remedy. Requiring a …rm to coordinate the beginning and ending dates of its contracts with suppliers would be simply too intrusive and ine¢ cient.
were subsequently sold to another buyer such as IRI. 34 Two of Nielsen's contracts entered in 1994 contained MFN clauses, in addition to exclusivity clauses as Nielsen apparently recognized the risk that the latter would be struck down. In some circumstances, an MFN clause is reasonable. It ensures, for example, that the …rst purchaser of the input is not disadvantaged in downstream competition with a rival who is able to strike a more favorable price. (Because of the zero marginal cost of the input there is a risk that a lower price might be struck subsequently with a rival.)
Suppose in this case that exclusivity were struck down in these contracts. Could the MFN clauses, if they were allowed, have the e¤ect of exclusivity? A example shows that they could. To keep the analysis simple, imagine that there is a single upstream supplier of raw data, that the monopoly pro…ts that could be earned with the data are 10 dollars and that the pro…ts that could be earned by each duopolist in the market would be 3 dollars. 
Strategy and the Timing of Contract O¤ers in Nielsen
We represented the competition between Nielsen and IRI for rights to upstream data with a model in which the two …rms o¤ered simultaneous bids for exclusive and non-exclusive rights, rather than a model with a …rst-mover advantage to the incumbent. At least one retailer has requested bids on both an exclusive and non-exclusive basis in this market, 36 but in representing market competition (in the standard way) as a simultaneous game, we 34 The preferred-supplier contracts speci…ed a lower price conditional upon sale of the data to a second …rm, rather than a guarantee of price matching (Nielsen, p.62). The analysis is similar.
35 "For reasons discussed ... and, in particular, Dr. Winter's model, we are of the view that the provisions in question allow Nielsen to set its payments at a level that would make entry by a rational would-be entrant unpro…table." (Nielsen, p.67).
36 Nielsen, p.70.
abstracted from very interesting strategic interaction between the …rms. In support of our no-incumbent-…rst-mover assumption, IRI was the …rst to o¤er exclusive contracts in the market and indeed signed up 10 of the 11 suppliers of retailer scanner data to exclusive contracts. 37 This fact was Nielsen's principal defense in the case:
" Throughout the course of the proceedings counsel for Nielsen returned again and again to the origin of the present exclusive arrangements and the role of IRI to argue that, because IRI 'initiated'the practice of exclusives, Nielsen's use of exclusives cannot be anti-competitive. Nielsen's position was that it was forced to adopt exclusives in order to protect its legitimate business interests against the threat of being locked out of the emerging technology and to safeguard its existing tracking services."(Nielsen, p.68)
There is no doubt that Nielsen's decision to o¤er exclusive contracts in 1986 was the right business decision, notwithstanding the subsequent ruling in Nielsen that the contracts were illegal. Any antitrust challenge of the contracts was years away (8 years, as it turned out), the outcome of such a challenge uncertain, and the impact of a potential loss by Nielsen in the event of a challenge was simply a requirement that the contracts be abandoned.
38 Yet
Nielsen's defense of exclusionary contracts as a necessary response on its part to the use of these contracts by IRI was properly rejected by the Tribunal. In this civil matter, the issue was whether the continued use of the contracts by any party resulted in a substantial lessening of competition in the market, 39 not whether Nielsen as a practical and historical matter needed to adopt the contracts in 1986. "In the view of the Tribunal, retaining or obtaining a dominant position in order to defend another …rm potentially becoming dominant is not an acceptable business justi…cation." (Nielsen, p.68). Nielsen is an unusual case in that, as the Tribunal noted, Nielsen o¤ered no e¢ ciency explanation for its practice beyond self interest. , under which Nielsen's contracts were challenged, allows the Tribunal to implement a remedy to practices that are deemed to result in a substantial lessening of competition. It did not at the time, nor does it now, provide for the possibility of penalties to be imposed by the Tribunal. 39 The Tribunal recognized that it had no direct authority over IRI in designing its remedy: "We do not have the authority to order IRI, which is not a party before us, to do anything. We acknowledge the undertaking given by ... IRI to the Tribunal, stating that IRI will agree not to enter into exclusive arrangements with retailers if Nielsen is prohibited from doing so... We are con…dent that IRI, as a reputable public company, will comply with its undertaking." Nielsen, p.97. 40 "We do not accept that self-interest constitutes [a business] justi…cation. We note that Nielsen's experts also failed to provide any e¢ ciency rationale for the exclusives." (Nielsen, p.67) If IRI signed up 10 of the 11 input suppliers, how did Nielsen end up as the respondent in this case having exclusives with all 11 suppliers? The answer is in the IRI contracts. To protect against ending up with only a subset of suppliers of data, and competing against Nielsen which at least had an established demand based on a complete set of pre-scanner information on retail outlets, IRI o¤ered contracts that were conditional upon its success in signing all suppliers. Safeway was the hold out. Nielsen was able to strike an exclusive contract with Safeway, presumably for terms generous to Safeway, and the IRI contracts unravelled. IRI's contractual strategy back…red. This is an example of the hold-out problem in the acquisition of complementary inputs, parallel to the land assembly problem for an urban developer. The characterization of the optimal mechanism design in this type of situation -the mechanism that IRI should have used -is an unresolved question in economic theory.
The Impact of Nielsen: Exclusion via Implicit Contracts
Did the decision in this case transform the market for scanner-based information products from one with intense competition for the market to one with competition within the market, as in the U.S.? No. IRI competes in 8 countries around the world, but the market for scanner-based information remains a Nielsen monopoly in Canada.
The Tribunal recognized that grocery retailers might decide to continue to o¤er their data to only one customer even once any exclusivity inducements by Nielsen were prohibited. In fact, this is exactly what has happened. The exclusivity agreements have continued in what economists would label implicit contracts: each grocery supplier of raw data has apparently recognized that if it were to break the implicit agreement by selling the data to IRI as well as Nielsen, then the downstream monopoly would soon be replaced by a duopoly of close substitutes in which marginal costs were close to zero. The monopoly rents -which, as we have discussed, ‡owed almost entirely upstream to the grocers as suppliers of the scarce data -would disappear.
The Tribunal recognized that the likelihood of implicit contracts was increased by their decision to alter only the exclusivity clauses and not the current payments in the contracts; and the Tribunal also recognized that in the event that the implicit exclusivity contracts were not sustained, Nielsen would be left paying a higher price for the data under its (stillenforceable) contracts than IRI:
We do recognize ... two problems that may result from striking the exclusivity clauses without touching the current payments, with the result that Nielsen may choose, or may be required by contract law, to continue to make those payments to retailers.
[{] The …rst problem is that while the retailers would be able to increase their revenues in the short run by selling their data to IRI while also accepting the current level of payments from Nielsen, they could choose to forgo the additional payments from IRI if they believe that dealing with IRI could reduce their earnings in the long run. The result would be at least some de facto exclusives...The second problem is that Nielsen might have to continue its current level of payments, without receiving the bene…ts of exclusivity the payments were intended to secure, while its competitor makes payments at a lower level.
The Tribunal properly did not attempt to set prices in the contracts but in our view should have struck down the contracts entirely. New contracts would have been negotiated. It is of course possible that even then the de facto exclusivity may have emerged. But sustaining cooperation in dynamic games, as one equilibrium among many possible equilibria, often depends on initial conditions or focal points. The likelihood of the de factor exclusivity was increased by the Tribunal's decision because the decision left the current payments intact, as a focal point for the emergence of an implicit contract equilibrium.
Conclusion
This paper has synthesized the set of channels through which participants in a market have the incentive to enter into exclusionary contracts. Three of these theories operate in a market in which incumbency provides a …rst-mover advantage in o¤ering contracts to buyers; the fourth yields exclusionary contracts, under some conditions, in a model in which two downstream …rms bid simultaneously for the rights to upstream inputs. We examined an antitrust case that illustrated all four incentive channels as well as a set of strategic issues related to exclusionary contracts; the division of the rents from monopolization to the upstream …rms and the winning monopolist; the role of downstream contracts in rendering this division of rents more favorable to the winning bidder by rendering the bidding game more asymmetric, through the vertical externality which we introduced into the theory; the role of contract renegotiation in staggering the contracts to further shift the division of rents and to create not a monopoly, but potentially a barrier to the success of the "right" monopolist; most favoured nation contracts as substitute for exclusive contracts; …nally, the ultimate market success of implicit as opposed to explicit exclusionary contracts.
The Aghion-Bolton perspective on anticompetitive exclusionary contracts identi…es the incentives for the contracts in terms of transfers from agents outside the contracts. The synthesis that we o¤er shows the power of this perspective, isolating each incentive in the simplest departure from a benchmark in which privately optimal contracts are e¢ cient. This approach to understanding the private incentives for exclusionary contracts is valuable well beyond the static framework that we have explored in this paper. 41 41 Suppose, for example, that in an evolving industry the probability of discovering the next generation technology is higher for …rms operating in current market or that there is learning-by-doing of any other form, and that the set of buyers changes to some degree over time. In this dynamic market setting, exclusionary contracts can be explained in part as implementing a transfer from future buyers to the current market participants. Exclusionary contracts are potentially of even greater cost, and the Aghion-Bolton perspective more valuable, in dynamic market settings. Further, de…ne J 1 = j : a j = 1 and J 2 = j : a j = 2 . (The analogously de…ned J B is empty by hypothesis.) Note that at (ŝ 1 ;ŝ 2 ;â), given the strategy of …rm 2, for any " > 0, …rm 1 can change the allocation fromâ to a , by adopting a strategys 1 (") = (s where # ( ) stands for cardinality of the set in the bracket. In addition, we will …nd useful the following precise relationships between the payments by the two …rms under the two deviations (by 1 and by 2) from the supposed equilibrium
